EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice

Giorgia Albertin

No 2008/065, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper provides a political economy analysis of the incentives underpinning a country's decision to enter a regional trade agreement when a multilateral free trade agreement is available, and of how entering a regional trade agreement affects the incentives to pursue multilateral trade liberalization. Taking into account the influence exerted by organized interest groups in the formation of trade agreements, we derive a formal condition under which a regional trade agreement is preferred to a multilateral one. Furthermore, we show that a country's decision to enter a regional trade agreement unambiguously undermines the incentives towards multilateral trade liberalization.

Keywords: WP; free trade; interest group (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2008-03-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=21821 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2008/065

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().

 
Page updated 2022-06-25
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2008/065