Value of WTO Trade Agreements in a New Keynesian Model

Giovanni Ganelli and Juha Tervala

No 2015/037, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: We revisit the question of the quantitative benefits of WTO trade agreements in a setup that is non-standard from the traditional trade policy point of view. We show that in a New Keynesian model, unilateral trade liberalization reduces welfare due to terms-of-trade deterioration, creating an incentive for a trade agreement. For realistic parameter values, the value of an agreement, which cuts tariffs by one percentage point, is 0.5% to 2% of consumption, much larger than in trade models. The intuition for this result hinges on some New Keynesian features of our framework, such as imperfect competition and endogenous labor supply.

Keywords: WP; trade agreement; terms of trade; price index; Tariffs; terms of trade theory; trade liberalization; WTO; tariff reduction; WTO trade agreement; tariff rate; welfare gain; Trade agreements; Consumption; Labor supply; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2015-02-25
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42733 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Value of WTO trade agreements in a New Keynesian model (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2015/037

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().