Uncertainty and Investment: The Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet Channel

Sophia Chen ()

No 2015/065, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Rollover risk imposes market discipline on banks’ risk-taking behavior but it can be socially costly. I present a two-sided model in which a bank simultaneously lends to a firm and borrows from the short-term funding market. When the bank is capital constrained, uncertainty in asset quality and rollover risk create a negative externality that spills over to the real economy by ex ante credit contraction. Macroprudential and monetary policies can be used to reduce the social cost of market discipline and improve efficiency.

Keywords: WP; short-term debt; long-term debt; balance sheet; uncertainty; underinvestment; bank-creditor contract; asset portfolio; portfolio consist; capital structure; asset quality; liquidity needs; credit supply; bank financing; representative bank; incentive compatibility constraint; debt value; Asset valuation; Stocks; Financial statements; Liquidity requirements; Credit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2015-03-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42797 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2015/065

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().