Dealing with Systemic Sovereign Debt Crises: Fiscal Consolidation, Bail-ins or Official Transfers?

Damiano Sandri

No 2015/223, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: The paper presents a tractable model to understand how international financial institutions (IFIs) should deal with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, in which case private creditors' bail-ins entail international spillovers. Besides lending to the country up to its borrowing capacity, IFIs face the difficult issue of how to address the remaining financing needs with a combination of fiscal consolidation, bail-ins and possibly official transfers. To maximize social welfare, IFIs should differentiate the policy mix depending on the strength of spillovers. In particular, stronger spillovers call for smaller bail-ins and greater fiscal consolidation. Furthermore, to avoid requiring excessive fiscal consolidation, IFIs should provide highly systemic countries with official transfers. To limit the moral hazard consequences of transfers, it is important that IFIs operate under a predetermined crisis-resolution framework that ensures commitment.

Keywords: WP; international community; credit rationing; marginal social cost; Sovereign default; fiscal consolidation; debt restructuring; bail-ins; transfers; moral hazard; bail-in operation; crisis-prevention effort; break-even condition; crisis state; policy mix; financing needs; Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43
Date: 2015-10-16
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43347 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2015/223

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().