Optimal Macroprudential Policy and Asset Price Bubbles

Nina Biljanovska, Lucyna Gornicka and Alexandros Vardoulakis

No 2019/184, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: An asset bubble relaxes collateral constraints and increases borrowing by credit-constrained agents. At the same time, as the bubble deflates when constraints start binding, it amplifies downturns. We show analytically and quantitatively that the macroprudential policy should optimally respond to building asset price bubbles non-monotonically depending on the underlying level of indebtedness. If the level of debt is moderate, policy should accommodate the bubble to reduce the incidence of a binding collateral constraint. If debt is elevated, policy should lean against the bubble more aggressively to mitigate the pecuniary externalities from a deflating bubble when constraints bind.

Keywords: WP; marginal utility; real asset; transition probability; Collateral constraints; rational bubbles; macroprudential regulation; optimal policy; asset price bubble; collateral constraint; credit imbalance; equilibrium asset pricing; bubble component; Collateral; Asset bubbles; Asset prices; Credit; Consumption; Global; deflating bubble; borrowing constraint; bubble bursting; stock market bubble; asset price overvaluation; Stock markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44
Date: 2019-08-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Optimal Macroprudential Policy and Asset Price Bubbles (2019)
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