Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance

Pierre Cahuc and Stéphane Carcillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Flavien Moreau

No 2021/031, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Does labor court uncertainty and judge subjectivity influence firms’ performance? We study the economic consequences of judge decisions by collecting information on more than 145,000 Appeal court rulings, combined with administrative firm-level records covering the whole universe of French firms. The quasi-random assignment of judges to cases reveals that judge bias has statistically significant effects on the survival, employment, and sales of small low-performing firms. However, we find that the uncertainty associated with the actual dispersion of judge bias is small and has a non-significant impact on their average outcomes.

Keywords: Dismissal compensation; judge bias; firm survival; WP; pro-worker bias; appeal court rulings database; firm's employment; judge level (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 72
Date: 2021-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-law
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Related works:
Journal Article: Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance (2024)
Working Paper: Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance (2022)
Working Paper: Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance (2022)
Working Paper: Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance (2022)
Working Paper: Judge Bias in Labor Courts and Firm Performance (2020)
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