Strengthening Tax Governance Through Legal Design

Lydia Sofrona, Christophe Waerzeggers and Brendan Crowley

No 2025/017, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Well-functioning tax systems anchor their governance arrangements in law. This paper develops an analytical framework from which the core legal principles for sound tax governance can be derived to inform the design of countries’ legal frameworks for administration and tax procedure. It then applies this analytical framework to derive key legal features that should be embedded in laws for tax administration—including additional considerations for semi-autonomous revenue authorities— and tax procedure, to ensure a balance between tax administration powers and adequate taxpayer protections.

Keywords: Tax governance; tax law; tax administration; tax procedure; legal design; A. tax Governance; governance arrangement; design consideration; taxpayer relationship; Tax administration core functions; Taxpayer charter; Semi-autonomous revenue bodies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2025-01-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=559303 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2025/017

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().