Competing Trade Mechanisms and Monotone Mechanism Choice

Eberhard Feess (), Christian Grund, Markus Walzl and Ansgar Wohlschlegel

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck

Abstract: We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we investigate the choice between posted prices and auctions and demonstrate that sellers refuse to offer posted prices as long as (risk-neutral) buyers do not differ with respect to their transaction costs in both trade institutions. If some buyers have lower transaction costs when trading at a posted price, it is optimal for sellers to offer posted prices if and only if they have a sufficiently high reservation value. We develop an econometric technique to compare the selling probabilities and revenues of posted prices and auctions and confirm our theoretical predictions with data from the EURO 2008 European Football Championship.

Keywords: Competing Sellers; Single-Crossing; Auctions; Fixed Prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D44 D82 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2014-28

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