Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time
Morten Hedegaard (),
Rudolf Kerschbamer (),
Daniel Müller and
Jean-Robert Tyran ()
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a public good game and a trust game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality contribute more to the public good and are more likely to pick the trustworthy action in the trust game than other subjects. Since the experiments were spread out more than one year, our results suggest that there is a component of distributional preferences that is stable across games and over time.
Keywords: Distributional preferences; social preferences; Equality-Equivalence Test; representa- tive online experiment; trust game; public goods game; dictator game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Distributional Preferences Explain Individual Behavior Across Games and Time (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2019-09
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