Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Matthias Dahm, Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer

No 80926, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.

Keywords: Lobbying; Inefficient policies; Signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-pol
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Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying of Firms by Voters (2009)
Working Paper: Lobbying of Firms by Voters (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:080926

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