Political Party Representation and Electoral Politics in England and Wales, 1690-1747

Dan Bogart

No 141510, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: The Whig and Tory parties played an important role in British politics in the decades following the Glorious Revolution. This paper introduces new data on the political affiliation of all MPs in England and Wales between 1690 and 1747. The data have numerous applications for research. The focus here is on majority party representation and the electoral politics of constituencies. I show that the Whigs had stronger representation in municipal boroughs with small and narrow electorates, whereas the Tories were stronger in county constituencies and in boroughs with large and more democratic electorates. The Whigs were stronger in the Southeast region and the Tories in Wales and the West Midlands. After the Whig leader, Robert Walpole, became prime minister in 1721 the Whigs lost some presence in their traditional strongholds including counties where the Dissenter population was large. Finally, I incorporate data on electoral contests and show that the majority party generally lost strength in constituencies following contests.

Keywords: Political parties; Whigs; Tories; Rage of Party; Walpole; Glorious Revolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 N43 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 75 pages
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:141510

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