Apprentice pay in Britain, Germany and Switzerland: institutions, market forces, market power
Silvia Teuber and
Additional contact information
Paul Ryan: University of Cambridge
Karin Wagner: Hochschule fuer Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin
No 75, Economics of Education Working Paper Series from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW)
Although trainee pay is central to the economics of work-based training, institutionalists have paid it little attention, while economists typically assume that it is set by market clearing. We document large differences in the pay of metalworking apprentices in three countries: relative to the pay of skilled employees, it is high in Britain, middling in Germany, and low in Switzerland. Combining fieldwork evidence with national survey data, we associate apprentice pay with both institutional attributes and market forces: specifically, with trade union presence and goals, employer organisation, the contractual status of apprentices, the supply of eligible and interested young people, and public subsidies. Apprentice pay appears to have fallen in Britain and Germany as bargaining coverage has declined.
Keywords: Apprenticeship training; pay structure; trade unions; employers’ associations; collective bargaining; training contracts; young workers; public subsidy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J31 J41 J42 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hme, nep-lab and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iso:educat:0075
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Economics of Education Working Paper Series from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sara Brunner ().