Firms' method of pay and the retention of apprentices
Miriam Rinawi and
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Miriam Rinawi: Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Miriam Koomen
No 104, Economics of Education Working Paper Series from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW)
The new training literature views regulated labour markets as critical for firms' willingness to participate in apprenticeship training. These regulations allow training firms to retain their apprenticeship graduates at the end of the training period and recoup training costs. Yet, in spite of an only loosely regulated labour market, many Swiss firms offer and pay for training. Using representative data from a large employer-employee survey, we investigate whether these firms use performance-related pay to retain their graduates. We find that both the magnitude and the likelihood of performance-related pay are significantly related to a firm's retention success.
Keywords: Keywords: (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J33 M52 M53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2014-12, Revised 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
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Journal Article: Firms’ method of pay and the retention of apprentices (2020)
Working Paper: Should I stay or should I go? - The Effect of Performance Pay on the Retention of Apprenticeship Graduates (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iso:educat:0104
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