EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Incentive to Reduce Crop Trait Durability

Stefan Ambec, Corinne Langinier and Stéphane Lemarié

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: To reduce the competition from farmers who self-produce seed, an inbred line seed producer can switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two-period model we investigate the impact of crop durability on self-production, pricing and switching decisions, and we examine the impact of license fees paid by self-producing farmers. First, in an inbred line seed monopoly model, we find that the monopolist may produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more surplus from farmers. Further, the introduction of license fees improves efficiency. Second, we study how the monopolist's behavior is affected by the entry of a nondurable hybrid seed producer. We show that the inbred line seed producer might benefit from competing with a technologically dominated hybrid seed producer, as this allows for consumers' discrimination.

Date: 2006-03-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics 2008, vol. 90 no. 2, pp. 379-391

Downloads: (external link)
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/paper_12525_06007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives to Reduce Crop Trait Durability (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Incentive to reduce crop trait durability (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12525

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:12525