Incentives to Reduce Crop Trait Durability

Stefan Ambec, Corinne Langinier and Stéphane Lemarié

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2008, vol. 90, issue 2, 379-391

Abstract: To reduce the competition from farmers who self-produce seed, an inbred line seed producer can switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two-period framework, we first investigate the impact of crop durability on self-production, pricing and switching decisions. Second, we study how the introduction of a fee paid by self-producing farmers affects those decisions. We find that the monopolist may produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more surplus from farmers. Further, the introduction of a self-production fee improves efficiency. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Incentive to Reduce Crop Trait Durability (2006)
Working Paper: Incentive to reduce crop trait durability (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:90:y:2008:i:2:p:379-391

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