The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders

Sergio Currarini and Marco Marini

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The traditional representation of cooperative games with transferable utility is based on a "characteristic" function, specifying for each coalition the amount of utility that its members can ensure themselves in the underlying normal form game. This formulation is meant to isolate coalitional decisions, abstracting from the strategic complexity of the cooperation process. However, unless the payoffs of the members of a coalition and of its complement are independent (orthogonal games) or opposite (constant slim games), the characteristic function fails to be well defined^

Date: 1998-05-01
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Working Paper: The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders (1998)
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