The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders

Sergio Currarini () and Marco Marini

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers cooperative game theoretic settings in which forming coalitions can act as Stackelberg leaders. We de�fine a value function which modi�fies the gamma-value function (Hart & Kurz, 1983, Chander & Tulkens, 1997) by letting members of deviating coalitions move �first in choosing a coordinated strategy. We accordingly defi�ne what we call the phi-core, and characterize the phi-core allocations of a cartel formation game and of a public goods economy.

Keywords: Core; Cooperative Games; Oligopoly; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:22139

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