On Myopia as Rationale for Social Security

Torben M. Andersen and Joydeep Bhattacharya

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the real interest rate on saving evolves endogenously, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.

Date: 2011-05-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

Downloads: (external link)
https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/server/api/core/bitstre ... ad2bde8b0536/content
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
Journal Article: On myopia as rationale for social security (2011)
Working Paper: On Myopia as Rationale for Social Security (2008)
Working Paper: On Myopia As Rationale for Social Security (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genstf:201105010700001264

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().