On Myopia as Rationale for Social Security

Torben Andersen and Joydeep Bhattacharya

No 2401, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go social security in dynamically efficient economies. Contrary to received wisdom, if the real interest rate is exogenously fixed, enough myopia may justify public pensions but never alongside positive private savings. With sufficient myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the real interest rate on saving evolves endogenously, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.

Keywords: myopia; pensions; social security; dynamic efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E60 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On myopia as rationale for social security (2011)
Working Paper: On Myopia as Rationale for Social Security (2011)
Working Paper: On Myopia As Rationale for Social Security (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2401

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