Gradual Matching with Affirmative Action

Kriti Manocha and Bertan Turhan

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Admissions to technical colleges in India feature a multi-period matching process and are subject to a complex affirmative action policy. At each period, an assignment is produced, and applicants decide whether to finalize their assignments or participate in the next period with the possibility of updating their submitted rank-ordered lists (ROLs). Building on Haeringer and Iehl´e (2021), we formulate a multi-period college admissions problem where institutions’ choice rules incorporate affirmative action restrictions and are updated consistently. We show that it is safe for applicants to participate in additional periods when their updating rule on ROLs satisfies a mild regularity condition. We also introduce a backward-looking notion of stability for multi-period matching mechanisms that consider affirmative action constraints. We use our results to analyze the multi-stage mechanism currently used in admissions to engineering colleges in India.

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