On the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining

Klaus Ritzberger

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching frictionless world is not robust. We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informational requirements on the analyst.

Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1992-11
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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1992-06.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1992 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1992-06

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