On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining

Luis Corchon and Klaus Ritzberger

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the analyst.

Keywords: Subgame; Perfection; Rubinstein; Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining (1992)
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