VETO IN FIXED AGENDA SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCES

Josep E. Peris and Mª Carmen Sánchez
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Mª Carmen Sánchez: Universidad de Murcia

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the relationship between acyclic social decision functions and fixed agenda social choice correspondences which verify some rationality conditions (such as Pareto, independence, monotonicity or neutrality). This enables us to translate known sesults of monlotonicity or neutrality). This enables us to translate known sesults of existence of individuals with veto from the social decision functions context into the fixed agenda framework, such as t.hose of Blau anad Deb (1977), Blair and Pollak (1982),. . .

Keywords: Veto; Fixed Agenda SSC; Acyclic SDF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1995-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1995-08.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1995 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1995-08

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