Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences

M. Carmen SÂnchez () and Josep E. Peris
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M. Carmen SÂnchez: Department of Economics, University of Alicante, E-03080 Alicante, Spain

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 1, 97 pages

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the relationship between social decision functions (SDF) and fixed agenda social choice correspondences (fixed agenda SCC), satisfying some rationality conditions (such as Pareto, Independence, Monotonicity, Neutrality or Anonimity), with the aim of translating known results on the existence of individuals with veto power into the fixed agenda framework (e.g., Blair and Pollak [2], Blau and Deb [3], \dots). In order to do this, a new independence condition (which we call Pseudo-Independence), as well as a notion of veto power, are introduced in the context of fixed agenda SCC. The conclusion is that, by fixing the agenda, under Independence and Pareto assumptions, the existence of individuals with veto power cannot be avoided.

Date: 1998-11-16
Note: Received: 6 November 1995 / Accepted: 9 September 1997
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Working Paper: VETO IN FIXED AGENDA SOCIAL CHOICE CORRESPONDENCES (1995)
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