- EXISTENCE AND NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFICIENT SHARING RULES FOR A COMMONLY OWNED TECHNOLOGY

Luis Corchon and M. Socorro Puy

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocationsobtained by any continuous sharing rule contains a subselection that is Pareto efficient. We alsopresent a mechanism that implements in Nash equlibrium the Pareto efficient allocationscontained in an arbitrary sharing rule.

Keywords: Efficiency; Implementation; Sharing Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 H82 L32 P13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2000-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published by Ivie

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2000-03.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2000 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Departamento de Edición ().