Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology

Luis Corchon and M. Socorro Puy

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 2, 369-379

Abstract: Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule.

Date: 2002-04-10
Note: Received: 29 June 1998/Accepted: 15 November 2000
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Working Paper: - EXISTENCE AND NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFICIENT SHARING RULES FOR A COMMONLY OWNED TECHNOLOGY (2000)
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