Alfonso Rosa García and
Hubert Janos Kiss
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Alfonso Rosa García: Universidad de Murcia
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alfonso Rosa-García ()
Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)
We study a coordination problem where agents act sequentially. Agents are embedded in anobservation network that allows them to observe the actions of their neighbors. We find thatcoordination failures do not occur if there exists a sufficiently large clique. Its existence isnecessary and sufficient when agents are homogenous and sufficient when agents differ and theirtypes are private. Other structures guarantee coordination when agents decide in some particularsequences or for particular payoffs. The coordination problem embodied in our game is appliedto the problems of revolts and bank runs.
Keywords: Social networks; coordination failures; multiple equilibria; revolts; bank runs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D85 G21 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Coordination structures (2011)
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