Alfonso Rosa-García () and
Hubert Janos Kiss
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We study a coordination problem where agents act sequentially. Agents are embedded in an observation network that allows them to observe the actions of their neighbors. We find that coordination failures do not occur if there exists a sufficiently large clique. Its existence is necessary and sufficient when agents are homogenous and sufficient when agents differ and their types are private. Other structures guarantee coordination when agents decide in some particular sequences or for particular payoffs. The coordination problem embodied in our game is applied to the problems of revolts and bank runs.
Keywords: social networks; coordination failures; multiple equilibria; revolts; bank runs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D85 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Coordination structures (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:30463
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