Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior
Abdolkarim Sadrieh () and
Jan van Ours ()
No 1000, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effect that unemployed want to avoid getting a benefit sanction imposed (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter. Moreover, the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect. Benefit sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment.
Keywords: experiments; job search; sanctions; unemployment benefits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in: European Economic Review, 2009, 53 (8), 937-951
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Experiments on unemployment benefit sanctions and job search behavior (2009)
Working Paper: Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behaviour (2004)
Working Paper: Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1000
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().