High School Track Choice and Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Urban Mexico
Matteo Bobba () and
Marco Pariguana ()
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Matteo Bobba: Toulouse School of Economics
Marco Pariguana: University of Western Ontario
No 10506, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
We study how a large household windfall affects sorting of relatively disadvantaged youth over high school tracks by exploiting the discontinuity in the assignment of a welfare program in Mexico. The in-cash transfer is found to significantly increase the probability of selecting vocational schools as the most preferred options vis-a-vis other more academically oriented education modalities. We find support for the hypothesis that the transfer relaxes the liquidity constraints preventing relatively poor students from choosing a schooling career with higher out-of-pocket expenditures and higher expected returns. The observed change in stated preferences across tracks effectively alters school placement, and bears a positive effect on on-time graduation.
Keywords: school choice; tracking; financial constraints; vocational education; returns to education; regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I24 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
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