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Committee Search with Ex-ante Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Keigo Inukai (), Keisuke Kawata and Masaru Sasaki ()
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Masaru Sasaki: Osaka University

No 10760, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The paper develops a committee search model with ex-ante heterogeneous agents and designs laboratory experiments to test theoretical predictions. In the theoretical part of the study, there exists one and only one pivotal voter, who can perfectly and dominantly control the voting results of the committee search activities. The most important prediction is that nonpivotal voters become less picky in committee search than in single-agent search, but that a pivotal voter's voting behavior remains unchanged, regardless of the type of voting rules for the search. However, our experimental results did not support this prediction; not only the nonpivotal voters but also the pivotal voter became less picky in the committee search games. In addition, we found gender differences in voting behavior; females show more concern for other group members' payoff as well as themselves than do males.

Keywords: experiments; committee search; plurality voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Date: 2017-05
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