Targeting and Self-Targeting in a New Social Assistance Scheme

John Micklewright (), Aline Coudouel () and Sheila Marnie ()
Additional contact information
Aline Coudouel: World Bank
Sheila Marnie: UNICEF

No 1112, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The analysis of targeting of cash benefits is typically silent on whether any success is due to encouraging claims from the poor or to the decisions of administrators on the claims they receive. By contrast, the paper models the probabilities of households’ knowledge of a new social assistance scheme, of a claim conditional on knowledge, and of an award conditional on knowledge and claim. It uses household survey data from Uzbekistan where a new social assistance benefit is administered by community organisations. The paper therefore also illustrates problems of design of decentralised social assistance schemes in developing countries.

Keywords: targeting; self-targeting; social assistance; Uzbekistan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H53 I38 O15 P35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2004-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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