Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?

Eyal Baharad () and Leif Danziger ()
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Eyal Baharad: Bar-Ilan University
Leif Danziger: Ben Gurion University

No 11287, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the "almost" rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.

Keywords: committee decisions; scoring rules; "almost" voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ore
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Published - published in: Group Decision and Negotiation, 2018, 27, 129-151

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