Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime

Jennifer Hunt

No 1179, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.

Keywords: networks; crime; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 K4 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2004-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link With Crime (2004)
Working Paper: Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime (2004)
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