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How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search: A Field Experiment

Michèle Belot (), Philipp Kircher () and Paul Muller ()
Additional contact information
Michèle Belot: European University Institute
Philipp Kircher: European University Institute

No 11814, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study how job seekers respond to wage announcements by assigning wages randomly to pairs of otherwise similar vacancies in a large number of professions. High wage vacancies attract more interest, in contrast with much of the evidence based on observational data. Some applicants only show interest in the low wage vacancy even when they were exposed to both. Both findings are core predictions of theories of directed/competitive search where workers trade off the wage with the perceived competition for the job. A calibrated model with multiple applications and on-the-job search induces magnitudes broadly in line with the empirical findings.

Keywords: online job search; directed search; wage competition; field experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J63 J64 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-eur, nep-hrm and nep-lab
Date: 2018-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search - A Field Experiment (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: How wage announcements affect job search - a field experiment (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: How wage announcements affect job search - a field experiment (2018) Downloads
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