Divorced in a Flash: The Effect of the Administrative Divorce Option on Marital Stability in the Netherlands
Jan Kabátek
No 12150, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
Administrative divorce is an optional divorce procedure which allows couples to bypass the court system and dissolve their marriages in a streamlined, uncontested process. The lack of court involvement renders the administrative divorce faster and less expensive than the conventional divorce. In this paper, I investigate whether the administrative divorce option affected the stability of marriages in the Netherlands. Leveraging the ban of the procedure in 2009, I show that the divorce risks were 11.6% higher under the legal regime which allowed for administrative divorce. This effect is causal, and it exhibits considerable heterogeneity, being stronger among dual-earner couples, native couples, and couples living in rural regions.
Keywords: marital stability; divorce; administrative divorce; divorce costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 J18 K36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Working Paper: Divorced in a Flash: The Effect of the Administrative Divorce Option on Marital Stability in the Netherlands (2018) 
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