Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism

Ira Gang and Gil Epstein

No 1227, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.

Keywords: religion; fundamentalism; rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Public Choice, 2007, 132 (3-4), 257-271

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Related works:
Journal Article: Understanding the development of fundamentalism (2007)
Working Paper: Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism (2002)
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