Outlier Aversion in Evaluating Performance: Evidence from Figure Skating

Jungmin Lee

No 1257, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The quality of subjective performance evaluation is dependent on the incentive structures faced by evaluators, in particular on how they are monitored and themselves evaluated. Figure skating competitions provide a unique opportunity to study subjective evaluation. This paper develops and tests a simple model of what I call "outlier aversion bias" in which subjective evaluators avoid submitting outlying judgments. We find significant evidence for the existence of outlier aversion. Individual judges within a game manipulate scores to achieve a targeted level of agreement with the other judges. Furthermore, a natural experiment shows that the dispersion of scores across judges depends upon the type of judge-assessment system and its implication for outlier aversion. Agreement may not be a good criterion for the validity of an evaluation system, contradicting the industrial psychology and personnel management literature.

Keywords: subjective performance evaluation; outlier aversion bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2004-08
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Published - published as 'Outlier Aversion in Subjective Evaluation: Evidence From World Figure Skating Championships' in: Journal of Sports Economics, 2008, 9 (2), 141-159

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