Learning Management through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design
Girum Abebe (),
Marcel Fafchamps (),
Michael Koelle () and
Simon Quinn ()
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Michael Koelle: University of Oxford
Simon Quinn: University of Oxford
No 12572, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
We place young professionals into established firms to shadow middle managers. Using random assignment into program participation, we find positive average effects on wage employment, but no average effect on the likelihood of self-employment. We match individuals to firms using a deferred-acceptance algorithm, and show how this allows us to identify heterogeneous treatment effects by firm and intern characteristics. We find striking heterogeneity in self-employment effects, and show that some assignment mechanisms can substantially outperform random matching in generating employment and income effects. These results demonstrate the potential for matching algorithms to improve the design of field experiments.
Keywords: propensity score; field experiments; management practices; self-employment; causal inference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J64 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-ent, nep-exp and nep-lma
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Working Paper: Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design (2019)
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