Workplace Unionism, Collective Bargaining and Skill Formation: New Results from Mixed Methods

Fabio Berton, Anna Carreri, Francesco Devicienti () and Andrea Ricci ()
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Anna Carreri: University of Verona
Andrea Ricci: INAPP – Institute for Public Policy Analysis

No 12712, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Among the steps to improve a country's competitiveness, several commentators and international institutions include a general emphasis on deregulation and decentralization of industrial relations. In this paper, we contribute to this debate by studying whether and how firm-level unionism and collective agreements affect workplace training, a key ingredient to competitiveness. Theory provides inconclusive predictions on the various channels and processes through which firm-level industrial relations may affect workplace training. Quantitative and qualitative analyses, when used in isolation, have also proved insufficient for an adequate account of the various factors at play. This is where our paper mostly contributes. In the spirit of opening the "black box" of firm-level unionism and collective bargaining, we mix together quantitative and qualitative strategies. Our results suggest that workplace unionism, and especially decentralized collective agreements, favor workplace training in subtler and often more dynamic ways than commonly understood.

Keywords: firm-level bargaining; workplace training; industrial relations; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lab and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published as 'The collective voice of unions and workplace training in Italy: new insights from mixed methods' in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2023, 61 (3), 595 - 622

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