Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Evidence From Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States

Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore () and Olivier Deschenes
Additional contact information
David Ashmore: Princeton University

No 128, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we report the results of the only field test of which we are aware that uses randomized trials to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment claims and benefits paid in the U.S. unemployment insurance (UI) program. These experiments, which we implemented in four sites in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Tennessee, were designed to explicitly test claims based on nonexperimental data, summarized in Burgess and Kingston (1987), that a prime cause of overpayments is the failure of claimants to actively seek work. Our results provide no support for the view that the failure to actively search for work has been a cause of overpayments in the UI system.

Keywords: work-search requirement; overpayment; Social experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2000-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-lab, nep-ltv, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: Journal of Econometrics, 2005, 125 (1-2), 53-75

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Journal Article: Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? Evidence from randomized trials in four U.S. States (2005)
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