Who Demands Labour (De)Regulation in the Developing World? Insider–Outsider Theory Revisited

Lucas Ronconi, Ravi Kanbur and Santiago López-Cariboni ()
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Santiago López-Cariboni: Universidad de la República, Uruguay

No 12831, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Contrary to the predictions of the insider–outsider model, we show that the large majority of outsiders in developing countries support, rather than oppose, protective labour regulations. This evidence holds across countries in different regions, across different types of protective labour regulations (i.e. severance payment, minimum wages, working time), and for different categories of outsiders (i.e. unemployed workers and employees without access to legally mandated labour benefits). We revise the economic and political assumptions of the insider–outsider model, discussing their empirical relevance in a developing country context.

Keywords: monopsony; segmentation; labour; informal; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J4 J8 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-lma, nep-ltv and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: International Labour Review, 2023, 162 (2), 223-243

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Working Paper: Who demands labour (de)regulation in the developing world?: Insider-outsider theory revisited (2019)
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