Game of Prejudice: Experiments at the Extensive and Intensive Margin

Utteeyo Dasgupta, Subha Mani, Joseph Vecci () and Tomas Zelinsky
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Joseph Vecci: University of Gothenburg

No 13085, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In an unique lab-in-the-field experiment we design a novel labor market environment, the Game of Prejudice, to elicit preferences for discrimination towards the largest minority group in Europe (the Roma) at the intensive margins as well as at the extensive margins. Our unique experiment design allows us to separate taste-based discrimination from statistical discrimination and examine the impacts of raising the costs of discrimination in such situations. We find discrimination to be commonplace at both margins, with stronger incidence at the extensive margin. We also find higher incidence of taste-based discrimination compared to statistical discrimination. Importantly, we find that when the cost of taste-based discrimination is made sufficiently high, such behavior disappears at the intensive and extensive margins, providing support for labor market policies that make discrimination very costly for the employer.

Keywords: lab-in-the field experiment; intensive margin; extensive margin; discrimination; Slovakia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D3 I1 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Working Paper: Game of Prejudice – Experiments at the Extensive and Intensive Margin (2020)
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