Jumping the Queue: Nepotism and Public-Sector Pay

Andri Chassamboulli and Pedro Gomes

No 13086, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We set up a model with search and matching frictions to understand the effects of employment and wage policies, as well as nepotism in hiring in the public sector, on unemployment and rent seeking. Conditional on inefficiently high public-sector wages, more nepotism in public-sector hiring lowers the unemployment rate because it limits the size of queues for public-sector jobs. Wage and employment policies impose an endogenous constraint on the number of workers the government can hire through connections.

Keywords: public-sector wages; nepotism; public-sector employment; unemployment; queues (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J31 J45 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-lma and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Review of Economic Dynamics, 2017, 142, 331-347

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Related works:
Journal Article: Jumping the queue: nepotism and public-sector pay (2021)
Working Paper: Jumping the Queue: Nepotism and Public-Sector Pay (2019)
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