Immigrant Franchise and Immigration Policy: Evidence from the Progressive Era
Costanza Biavaschi () and
Giovanni Facchini ()
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Costanza Biavaschi: Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
No 13195, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
What is the role played by immigrant groups in shaping migration policy in the destination country? We address this question exploiting cross-state variation in U.S. citizens' access to the franchise, due to the presence of residency requirements. First we document that naturalized immigrants were more geographically mobile than natives. Second, congressmen representing districts with large numbers of naturalized U.S. citizens were more likely to support an open migration policy, but this effect is reversed once we account for residency requirements. Our results indicate that electoral accountability of U.S. congressmen to naturalized immigrants was a key factor in explaining this outcome.
Keywords: immigration policy; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-mig
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Working Paper: Immigrant franchise and immigration policy: Evidence from the Progressive Era (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13195
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