Selection and Incentives under Time Pressure: The Importance of Framing

Maria De Paola (), Francesca Gioia () and Valeria Pupo ()

No 13474, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we investigate whether the framing of the incentives used to foster participation into contexts characterized by high degrees of time pressure affects individuals' self-selection. At this aim we run a lab-in-the-field experiment structured in two parts. The first part investigates individual characteristics that affect performance under time pressure, while the second is devoted to analyze how the decision to work under time pressure is affected by the reward/punishment framing of incentives. We find that individuals characterized by a high degree of risk aversion perform worse under time pressure. Nonetheless, when facing a penalty incentive scheme these individuals are more likely to choose to work with strict term limits, suggesting that penalty contracts might generate adverse selection problems.

Keywords: time pressure; bonus; penalty; incentive schemes; framing; selection; lab-in-the-field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 C91 D01 D91 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-lma, nep-ore and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp13474.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13474

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().