Crowding-Out or Crowding-In? Heterogeneous Effects of Insurance on Solidarity

Andreas Landmann (), Björn Vollan, Karla Henning () and Markus Frölich ()
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Andreas Landmann: University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
Karla Henning: KfW Development Bank
Markus Frölich: University of Mannheim

No 13688, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We analyze whether the availability of formal insurance products affects informal solidarity transfers in two independent behavioral experiments in the Philippines. The first experiment allows for communication, non-anonymity and unrestricted transfers. The second experiment mimics a laboratory setting without communication and preserves anonymity, which minimizes strategic concerns. The introduction of an insurance treatment alters solidarity in both experiments. We find crowding-out effects in the first setting with strategic motives, while there are even crowding-in effects due to insurance availability in the anonymous experiment. These and additional supporting results are in line with crowding-out of strategic, but not necessarily intrinsic motives due to the availability of insurance.

Keywords: insurance; solidarity; crowding effects; lab-in-the-field experiment; Philippines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 87 pages
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ias and nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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