Who Benefits from Corporate Social Responsibility? Reciprocity in the Presence of Social Incentives and Self-Selection

Guglielmo Briscese, Nick Feltovich and Robert Slonim ()
Additional contact information
Robert Slonim: University of Sydney

No 14067, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Firms can donate a share of profits to charity as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent experiments have found that such initiatives can induce higher effort by workers, generating benefits for both sides of the labour market. We design a novel version of the gift-exchange game to account for self-selection, and find that wages remain the most effective incentive to attract and motivate workers, with corporate donations playing a smaller role than previously suggested. We also show that firms substitute donations to charity with lower wage offers, keeping their profits constant but reducing workers' earnings. Initiatives of corporate philanthropy can thus be marginally beneficial for firms, but considerably costly for workers.

Keywords: gift exchange; reciprocity; corporate philanthropy; self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 77 pages
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp14067.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14067

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().