Motivational Goal Bracketing with Non-rational Goals

Alexander K. Koch () and Julia Nafziger
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Alexander K. Koch: Aarhus University

No 14142, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We provide a tractable model of motivational goal bracketing by a present-biased individual, extending previous work to show that the main insights from models with rational goals carry over to a setting with non-rational goals. Goals motivate because they serve as reference points that make substandard performance psychologically painful. A broad goal allows high performance in one task to compensate for low performance in the other. This partially insures against the risk of falling short of ones' goal(s), but creates incentives to shirk in one of the tasks. Narrow goals have a stronger motivational force and thus can be optimal, providing an explanation for observed instances of narrow bracketing. In particular, if one task outcome becomes known before working on the second task, narrow bracketing is always optimal.

Keywords: non-rational goals; multiple tasks; motivational bracketing; self-control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C70 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics , 2021, 94, 101740

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Journal Article: Motivational goal bracketing with non-rational goals (2021)
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