It’s Payback Time: New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma

Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrea Salvanti, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo ()
Additional contact information
Andrea Salvanti: Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Giancarlo Spagnolo: Stockholm University

No 15023, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant of cooperation. This comment introduces the "Payback" strategy, which is similar to TFT but is sustainable in equilibrium. Using the data from the original article, we show that Payback captures most of the empirical support previously attributed to TFT, and that the risk dominance criterion based on Payback can explain the observed cooperation patterns.

Keywords: asymmetric strategies; imperfect monitoring; indefinitely repeated games; risk dominance; strategic risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: It's Payback time: new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma (2022)
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